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1 
CARGILL V. ACE AMERICAN INS. CO.: THE MINNESOTA SUPREME 
COURT REMINDS US OF THE VALUE OF EVERY 2-YEAR-OLD’S 
FAVORITE QUESTION  
 






That, I learned in one of the more productive hours of my law school experience, is the answer any lawyer 
should be ready to give in support of any legal argument.1 And, as one of my fellow students learned the 
hard way in one of those hard-to-watch Socratic moments, “because another case says so” is not always or 
even often a good enough  “why.” Common law, by its nature, evolves. So it is not enough to rest on the 
argument that a court should apply your proposed rule because it happens to be the rule that has been applied 
before. A lawyer making an argument or, though my professor did not say so, a judge issuing a decision, 
should be able to articulate a reason the legal rule she advocates should be adopted or maintained, and why 
it functions better than the alternative or alternatives. 
 
While this idea in its broadest conception may not fuel much controversy, it does not always find its way 
into practice. Law schools often teach students to rely on the rules that have already been formed by 
centuries of work by their predecessors. It is natural, then, that when we leave law school we make many 
of our legal arguments by simply citing cases that articulated or reiterated the rule we hope favors our 
clients. Most of the time, this has little practical impact because those rules were crafted for reasons that 
were good at the time and remain good today. But there is a real risk that by not remaining conscious of the 
“why” behind the rules, we will slide into reliance on the idea that a rule should be applied because it is the 
rule that was quoted time and again by other courts in other disputes presenting different facts. 
 
When this happens, a tension can develop between two approaches to the law. On the one hand is what this 
article refers to as “formalistic” law, the adherence to established law in a given case not because it is the 
better rule, but because it is the existing rule, a sort of jurisprudential version of “that’s the way we’ve 
always done it.” On the other is “pragmatic” law, the crafting of new legal rules because established law 
                                                          
* Chad Snyder is a partner at Snyder Gislason Frasier L.L.C., a firm representing individuals, businesses, and artists. 
Prior to forming this firm, he was a solo practitioner for a few years, and before that he was an attorney with Zelle 
Hofmann Voelbel & Mason, L.L.P in Minneapolis. His practice has focused on litigation, including a significant 
practice in insurance coverage representing both insurance companies and insureds in cases ranging from a 
homeowner's claim for a few thousand dollars in hail damage to multi-million dollar disputes over damaged 
products or destroyed commercial buildings. Chad graduated from the University of Iowa College of Law in 1998 
with highest distinction. 
1 It is, I think, purely happenstance that the professor was teaching a course on insurance law and that this article is 
inspired by a decision in an insurance dispute. Though insurance jurisprudence is infused with public policy 
concerns, I’m reasonably certain my professor did not intend to limit his advice to insurance litigation. 
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no longer serves the purpose it was designed for and maybe never did. There is some risk that through the 
course of this article, the formalistic approach will come off poorly. That is largely because in the case of 
the legal rule at issue in the Minnesota Supreme Court decision that prompted me to write this article (or, 
more precisely, prompted someone to ask me to write this article), Cargill, Inc. v. Ace American Insurance 
Co.,2 I believe the formalistic rule the court overturned is inferior to the more practical approach it adopted.3 
Do not assume such is always the case. Common law is, after all, a body of jurisprudence that is largely the 
product of evolving pragmatism. Today’s formalistic rules were crafted out of a need for pragmatic 
solutions to yesterday’s legal quandaries, and should not be tossed aside or even significantly modified on 
a whim. Being open to pragmatism should not be mistaken for advocating legal rule-making on a case-by-
case, results-oriented basis. New is not always better. One answer to “why” that threads its way through 
virtually every area of law is that citizens, businesses and governments should have a shared sense of the 
rules. Precedent and stare decisis may even be a presumed answer to “why” because of the value of 
“stability in the law.”4 
 
But that does not mean the established rules should be followed simply because they are established. It is 
an old maxim that “[n]o rule of the common law could survive the reason on which it was founded,”5 and 
so even established rules, at least every now and then, should be checked to make sure their “why” is still 
valid. 
 
Because, as the decision in Cargill demonstrates, sometimes it isn’t. 
 
Even then, a lawyer or court should be able to articulate why the benefit of changing or replacing the rule 
outweighs the disruption that results from overturning precedent. The Cargill decision is a good example 
of a case providing that explanation. It is not the only case to do so; common law tradition is marked by 
these evolutions, yielding rules that are “continually changing and expanding with the progress of society.”6 
But this particular decision brought my law professor’s words to mind because courts are divided over the 
issue the Cargill court resolved (contribution rights among liability insurers), and that division rests on a 
tension between a pragmatic and a formalistic approach to the question presented. 
 
This article, therefore, will not focus entirely on the Cargill decision itself. The decision is relatively short, 
worth reading, and should be an easy read even for those who do not practice in the area of insurance 
law.  While some discussion of the decision is needed for context, much of this article will look at the 
                                                          
2 784 N.W.2d 341 (Minn. 2010). 
3 I should also disclose at this point that I was local counsel for amicus curiae Complex Insurance Claims Litigation 
Association in the briefing submitted to the Supreme Court, which argued against application of the formalistic rule 
to the facts of the Cargill case. Though the vast majority of the work on that brief was performed by attorneys at 
Wiley Rein, I certainly shared the view that the rule existing at the time (which will be discussed below) should not 
have been applied to the dispute between Cargill and its insurers. 
4 See Cargill, 784 N.W.2d at 352. 
 
5 Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 384 (1933) (quoting Ketelsen v. Stilz, 184 Ind. 702, 708, 111 N.E. 423, 425 
(1916)). 
6 Ketelsen v. Stilz, 184 Ind. 702, 708, 111 N.E. 423, 425 (1916). 
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broader tension between the analysis of those courts that permit contribution7 among insurers and those that 
do not as a way of providing a concrete example of the value of the lesson I absorbed years ago in a law 
school classroom. 
 
THE CARGILL LITIGATION 
 
 
The Cargill case has its origins in Oklahoma and Arkansas.8 In 2005, Oklahoma sued Cargill under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (generally known as CERCLA) 
and the Solid Waste Disposal Act.9 The state sought recovery for damage to land and water in the Illinois 
River Watershed that it alleged was caused by Cargill’s disposal of poultry waste.10 In a series of suits in 
Arkansas, Cargill also faced personal injury and wrongful death claims also arising out of the company’s 
waste disposal practices. 11 
 
Cargill notified the insurance companies that had provided it with comprehensive general liability (CGL) 
coverage between 1956 and 2006, a total of about 50 carriers. None of those carriers were willing to provide 
a defense to Cargill in the Oklahoma and Arkansas litigation without contribution from the other insurers, 
or at least a right to seek such contribution. Liberty Mutual had agreed to pay its share of the defense costs, 
but Cargill rejected that offer. Instead, it filed suit in February 2007, asking the court to declare that each 
of the insurers had a “duty to provide a complete and undivided defense.”12 What Cargill sought was the 
right to pick one insurance company from the 50 that had provided coverage over the previous half-century 
and require it to pay for all the costs incurred in defending the Arkansas and Oklahoma lawsuits.  As of 
February 2007, that sum was $5.4 million, according to Cargill.13 Cargill selected Liberty Mutual as its 
unwilling champion.14  
 
A brief discussion of some basics of insurance law will be helpful here. The fight between Cargill, Liberty 
Mutual and the other insurers focuses on one of the two contractual duties imposed by a CGL policy – the 
duty to defend. Under long-established law, “[t]he duty to defend is distinct from and broader than the duty 
to indemnify.”15 As general rule, an insurer’s duty to defend is “determined by comparing the "complaint" 
                                                          
7 The term “contribution” is used somewhat loosely and should not be construed as enveloping the body of law 
governing the doctrine of contribution. This is in large part because, as is noted below, courts have tended to use the 
term flexibly and interchangeably with “subrogation” to explain the basis for the right of one liability insurer to seek 
a share of defense costs from another.  It is also in part because using the phrase “the right of one liability insurer to 
seek a share of defense costs from another” time and time again would be cumbersome for both writer and reader. 
8 See Cargill, 784 N.W.2d at 343. 
9 See id. at 344. 
 
10 See id. 
 
11 See id. 
 
12 Id. at 344. 
 
13 Id. at 344 n.3. 
 
14 See Cargill, 784 N.W.2d at 344. 
15 SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 316 (Minn. 1995). 
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with the terms of the policy language.”16  Once “the insured comes forward with facts showing arguable 
coverage, or the insurer becomes independently aware of such facts, the insurer must either defend or further 
investigate the potential claim,”17 and “[t]he burden is on the insurer to prove that it has no duty to defend.”18 
The reasoning behind this rule is that the insured’s right to a defense in an underlying suit should not be put 
in limbo while the insured and its insurer fight out the question of coverage. Not all insureds have Cargill’s 
ability to fund their own defense. 
 
While Liberty Mutual and the other insurers have not conceded there is coverage for the claims against 
Cargill, they did recognize a duty to provide a defense.19 The question was how that duty would be honored. 
In May 2007, several of the companies offered to pay the costs of defense in the Oklahoma and Arkansas 
suits if Cargill executed a loan receipt agreement.20 Cargill refused.21 Five months later, Liberty Mutual 
went so far as to send Cargill a check in partial payment of defense costs, again conditioning the payment 
on Cargill’s signing a loan receipt.22 Cargill again refused, returning the check. 23 
 
LOAN RECEIPTS: A USEFUL FICTION 
 
 
Those loan receipts are at the heart of the Cargill litigation. The use of loan receipts can be traced to 
admiralty. In Lukenbach v. W.J. McCahan Sugar Refining Co.,24 the Supreme Court explained that under 
such an agreement shipper received from the insurance companies, promptly after the adjustment of the 
loss, amounts aggregating the loss; and this libel was filed in the name of the shipper, but for the sole benefit 
of the insurers, through their proctors and counsel, and wholly at their expense. If, and to the extent (less 
expenses) that, recovery is had, the insurers will receive payment or be reimbursed for their so-called loans 
to the shipper. If nothing is recovered from the carrier, the shipper will retain the money received by it 
without being under obligation to make any repayment of the amounts advanced. In other words, if there is 
no recovery here, the amounts advanced will operate as absolute payment under the policies.25  
 
Though the defendant in Luckenbach asked the Court to disregard the loan receipt as a “fiction and 
subterfuge,” the Court found the arrangement to be an entirely acceptable solution to the problem of how 
an insured shipper could be promptly paid for a loss while preserving the right of the insurer to pursue 
                                                          
16 Id. (citing Garvis v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 497 N.W.2d 254, 256 (Minn. 1993)). 
 
17 Id. 
18 Id. (citing Lanoue v. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos., 278 N.W.2d 49, 52 (Minn. 1979)). 
19 See Cargill, 784 N.W.2d at 345. 
 
20 See id. 
 
21 See id. 
22 See id. 
23 See id. 
24 248 U.S. 139 (1918). 
25 Id. at 147-48. 
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recovery against the party potentially at fault for the loss.26 “It is creditable to the ingenuity of business men 
that an arrangement should have been devised which is consonant both with the needs of commerce and 
the demands of justice.” 27 
 
In modern use, particularly in Minnesota,28 “[u]nder a loan receipt agreement, an insurer makes a loan to 
the insured for defense costs, which the insured agrees to repay from amounts recovered from another 
insurer.”29 These “loans” were largely a fiction with it being generally understood that the insurers owed 
the duty to defend, which is why the “loans” were only to be repaid to the extent of a recovery from other 
insurers, but a fiction made necessary by the need to find a practical solution to the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s formalistic decision in Iowa National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance 
Co. 30  
 
THE IOWA DECISION 
 
 
Iowa National started with a car accident.31 H.H. Kneeland, insured by Iowa National, was driving a car 
owned by Mitchell Boyer, Inc., which was insured by Universal Underwriters.32 Kneeland was sued, and 
Iowa National paid for his defense and sought a share of the defense costs from Universal.33 According to 
the Supreme Court decision, Iowa National’s complaint was styled in terms of breach of contract, but its 
arguments and the trial court’s decision awarding Iowa National a judgment of $3,703.83 were based in 
equitable principles of indemnity, contribution or subrogation, “growing out of a circumstance by which 
Universal is said to have been unjustly enriched by reason of the expenses incurred by Iowa National.” 34 
 
The trial court may have been persuaded by Iowa National’s appeal to equitable principles, but the 
Minnesota Supreme Court was not. It reversed Iowa National’s judgment, basing its decision in bright-line 
principles of contract law, essentially holding that in the absence of a contract between itself and Universal, 
Iowa National had no grounds to seek a recovery.35 Universal may well have breached its own duty to 
defend Kneeland, but, the court observed, “no contractual obligation existed to make one insurer 
accountable to the other for a breach of its independent obligation to the insured,” and “[t]he obligation of 
                                                          
26 See id. at 148-49. 
 
27 Id. 
28 Research found them discussed in other jurisdictions, but not with the same frequency as Minnesota. 
29 Cargill, 748 N.W.2d at 345 n.5. 
30  150 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1967). 
31 See id. at 235. 
32 See id. 
33 See id. 
34 Id. 
35 See Iowa Nat’l, 150 N.W.2d at 236. 
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defending an insured and paying for the defense is a separate obligation existing exclusively between the 
insurer and the insured.” 36 
 
The court was utterly unpersuaded by, and even dismissive of, the argument that Iowa National was entitled 
to recovery based on an equitable doctrine such as contribution or subrogation.37 The court stated: 
 
We dispose of the contention that recovery may be supported on the basis of contribution by observing that 
the two companies have no joint liability or common obligation. Both were obligated to defend under 
separate contractual undertakings which would not support a common obligation for the purpose of 
invoking the principle of contribution. 38 
 
Subrogation was likewise rejected “since each of the companies had a separate and distinct obligation to 
defend. The equities between them are at best equal.”39 The court’s adherence to formal rules of privity 
found some practical support in the nature of the underlying loss. As it observed, the “charges upon which 
Iowa National’s judgment is based grow out of expenses any automobile liability insurer would be expected 
to incur.”40 The company, in exchange for a premium, had agreed to pay the cost of defending its insured 
in any lawsuit arising from an auto accident.41 It was not being asked or compelled to do any more than it 
had contracted to do. The fact that another company had entered the same contract really had no bearing on 
the agreement between Iowa National and its customer. The defense costs the insurer paid “are Iowa 
National’s expense of doing business.” 42 
 
The Iowa National reasoning was subsequently applied twice by the Minnesota Supreme Court. In St. Paul 
School District v. Columbia Transit Corp.,43 the underlying loss again arose from an auto accident involving 
a school bus. The court again reversed a trial court’s order awarding the insurer that paid for defense costs 
contribution from the insurer that refused a defense. The decision relied on Iowa National, again asserting 
that the defense costs were the insurer’s “expenses of doing business.”44 Less than a year later, in Nordby 
v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co.,45 in yet another auto accident case, the court reached the same conclusion 
for the same reasons: “An insurer has no right of action against another insurer to recover the cost of 
                                                          
36 Id. 
37 See id. at 237. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 See Iowa Nat’l, 150 N.W.2d at 237. 
41 See id. 
42 Id. 
43 321 N.W.2d 41 (Minn. 1982). 
44 Id. at 48.  
45 329 N.W.2d 820 (Minn. 1983). 
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defending the insured, since there is no contractual obligation between insurers.”46 Nordby’s presence as a 
plaintiff did not alter the court’s analysis because, having had his defense costs paid by one insurer, he 
suffered no actual loss that would give rise to a claim against the non-defending insurer. 47 
 
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS BEGIN TO CHIP AWAY AT IOWA NATIONAL 
 
 
The first chink in the Iowa National rule appeared in the Supreme Court’s decision in Jostens, Inc. v. 
Mission Insurance Co.48 Factually, Jostens offered a potentially significant difference from Iowa National, 
St. Paul School District and Nordby: Jostens, the insured, did pay its own way in defending the underlying 
lawsuit and employment action.49 Jostens then sued two of its insurers, Wausau and Mission.50 While 
summary judgment motions were pending, Wausau entered a loan receipt agreement with Jostens, and the 
case against Wausau was dismissed.51 Jostens agreed to maintain its action against Mission and to repay 
the Wausau “loan” from any recovery it received against Mission.52 The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld 
the arrangement, affirming the trial court’s judgment in favor of Jostens and ultimately Wausau. 53  It 
distinguished the case from Nordby because Jostens, unlike the insured in Nordby, had actually incurred 
defense costs in the underlying suit before being fully compensated by Wausau.54 This frankly seems a bit 
of a distinction without a difference.  In both Nordby and Jostens, the court considered a case in which the 
insured had been made whole by one of its insurers. Indeed, the court seemed to acknowledge this in 
Jostens, stating that “the dispute is primarily between the two insurers.” 55  Its reasoning, however, 
disregarded that reality, and the court chose “to analyze the coverage issues between the insurers with 
Jostens as the real party plaintiff.” 56 
 
However, the court’s ultimate decision did seem to deviate from Iowa National. Wausau (through Jostens) 
sought full indemnity for the defense costs. Under the reasoning of Iowa National, this should have been 
available as a remedy. Jostens, as the nominal “real party plaintiff,” had a right to demand full defense cost 
                                                          
46 Id. at 824. 
47 See id. 
48 387 N.W.2d 161 (Minn. 1986). 
49 See id. at 162. 
50 See id. 
51 See id. 
52 See id. at 163. 
53 See Jostens, 387 N.W.2d at 168. 
54 Id. at 165 (citing Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 556-57 (Minn. 1977) (the 
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coverage from either insurer independently. According to Iowa National, neither insurer had any recourse 
against the other; thus, Jostens should have been permitted to recover the entirety of its claim from Mission, 
and then pay all of that to Wausau under the terms of the loan receipt. Nevertheless, the court rejected the 
demand for full indemnity, holding instead that though an insured may recover its defense costs from either 
insurer or both, “the insurers, as between them, shall be equally liable for the insured’s defense costs.”57 
The court reasoned that: 
 
it hardly seems fair Mission should now be responsible for the entire costs simply because Jostens has 
selected Mission rather than Wausau to pay them. Who should pay the insured's defense costs should not 
depend on the whim or caprice of the insured, when, at the time the defense was needed, both insurers 
arguably had a duty to defend.58 
 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this approach nearly two decades later in Home Insurance Co. v. National 
Union Fire Insurance of Pittsburgh.59 In Home Insurance, as in Jostens, the insured and one of its insurers 
entered a loan receipt agreement after coverage litigation had been commenced.60 The remaining insurers 
challenged the standing of Home Insurance to pursue a claim for defense costs.61 Though reasserting the 
“general rule” that “one insurer cannot pursue reimbursement from another insurer for defense costs 
incurred in defending a mutual insured,”62 the court also noted that “we recognize an exception to this 
general rule when a loan receipt agreement is in place.”63 
 
So over time, the impact of the Iowa National rule was mitigated by the availability of loan receipts. By 
entering such an agreement, an insurer could meet its contractual obligation to provide a defense to its 
insured and preserve the ability to offset that cost by pursuing a claim against any more recalcitrant co-
insurers. For most insureds, a loan receipt agreement is not a big deal. The insured gets the defense cost 
coverage it is entitled to, and leaves to the insurers the question of who should be ultimately responsible for 
how much of it. Most of the litigation over allocation of defense costs, in fact, is between insurers; the 
insureds are only nominally parties. Despite what the court said in Jostens, the real parties in interest are 
the insurers. An insured seldom has any incentive to take a side in the fight. Cargill broke that mold. 
 
 
                                                          
57 Id. at 167. 
58 387 N.W.2d at 167. 
59 658 N.W.2d 522 (Minn. 2003). Cargill (through three of its subsidiary companies) was also the insured in Home 
Insurance. 
60 See id. at 526. 
61 See id. at 527. 
62 Id. (citing Iowa Nat’l, 150 N.W.2d at 237). 
63 Id. (citing Jostens, 387 N.W.2d at 167). 
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CARGILL’S INSURANCE PROGRAM MADE LOAN RECEIPTS POTENTIALLY COSTLY 
 
 
The Cargill case came about because of the way Cargill structured its insurance coverage, and the 
company’s concern that it might find itself liable for a share of the defense costs in Oklahoma and Arkansas. 
As Cargill stated in its brief to the court of appeals, it refused to sign a loan receipt because many of the 
policies containing a duty to defend were “fronted” policies, and it believed that those policies “are subject 
to deductibles, retentions, retrospective premiums, or are reinsured by a Cargill subsidiary that charges 
Cargill retrospective premiums.”64 As a practical matter, what that means is that Cargill could ultimately 
bear the cost of defense under those policies. The precise nature of the Cargill fronting arrangement has not 
been set forth in the Cargill decisions,65 but as the Supreme Court noted, fronting, “in general, is a situation 
where ‘an insurer, for a fee, issues a policy with the intent of passing most or all of the risk back to the 
policyholder, or to an unlicensed reinsurer or captive insurer.’”66 
 
What matters for our purposes is that because Cargill did not want to pay a share of its defense costs, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court was confronted with the question of whether Iowa National, with the exceptions 
that had been carved out over the intervening decades, still made sense, or if it ever did. The Cargill decision 
would probably never have come about had Cargill not employed a fronting strategy for its insurance 
program. The loan receipt mechanism may have been built upon a legal fiction, but insurers had adjusted 
to it and most insureds had no reason to care enough to rock the boat. Cargill, though, sought for insureds 
the power to control the loan receipt arrangement in a way that would have greatly diluted its value for 
insurance companies. 
 
There is an oft-repeated maxim that bad facts make bad law.67 For a lawyer standing within the confines of 
a given case, there may be an addendum to that maxim: Somebody else’s facts are bad facts. That is often 
the case in the law of insurance coverage. There is a practical difference between the coverage afforded 
sophisticated insureds like Cargill and that granted to small businesses or the auto and home coverage 
purchased by individuals and families.68 But because so many more policies are issued to individuals, 
families and small businesses, and because there is a public policy concern about the power imbalance 
between those insureds and the large companies issuing the insurance policies, much of insurance law arises 
                                                          
64 Brief of Appellant at n.5, Cargill, Inc. v. Ace American Ins. Co., 766 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (No. A08-
1082). 
65 At this point, in fact, there does not appear to have been a determination that Cargill would ultimately bear any 
share of defense costs under the fronting policies. Liberty Mutual argued that Cargill’s liability under the policies 
remained a question of fact. While that may ultimately mean that Cargill started this fight for nothing, it was 
probably a good litigation strategy. The company’s first line of argument was that it had the right to make the insurer 
of its choice pay all of the defense costs. Having lost that argument, it may still be able to argue that under the terms 
and conditions of the fronting policies, it is not liable for any share of the allocated defense costs. It was – and 
continues to be – a costly strategy in terms of litigation expense, but with millions of dollars at stake that is 
potentially a worthwhile expense. 
66 Cargill, 784 N.W.2d at 345 n.6 (quoting John F. O'Connor, Insurance Coverage Settlements and the Rights of 
Excess Insurers, 62 Md. L. Rev. 30, 47 n.86 (2003)). There are varied motives for entering these fronting 
arrangements, but that particular issue is beyond the scope of this article. 
67 A Westlaw search for “bad facts make bad law” in the ALLCASES database on February 24, 2011 yields 81 cases 
in which the court has employed this maxim. 
68 See Home Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d at 533. 
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from factual scenarios that have little relevance to a dispute like that between Cargill and Liberty Mutual.69 
Sometimes that leads to the creation of a legal rule that made pretty good sense when applied to coverage 
for a single loss, but is more difficult to justify for a catastrophic loss encompassing millions of dollars and 
potentially years of accumulated damage. That distinction, in a practical sense, is what the Minnesota 
Supreme Court found itself contemplating when Cargill petitioned for review. In a jurisprudential sense, 
the distinction could be described as part of the ongoing tension between formalistic and pragmatic rule-
making. 
 
The Iowa National decision was a largely formalistic decision. It was a clean application of established 
rules of contract law. The court reasoned that the right to defense cost coverage was “a contractual right of 
the insured irrespective of other insurance” and that a “controversy between the two insurance carriers who 
have no contractual relationship to each other cannot operate to alter the obligation that each owes unto the 
insured, with whom they each have a contract.”70 And, frankly, the court was right, formally at least. Iowa 
National sought a right based upon contribution, but contribution arises from a “joint liability or common 
obligation,” which these two insurers did not share.71 Rather, “[b]oth were obligated to defend under 
separate contractual undertakings.”72 In the context of the case’s facts, a single auto accident potentially 
insured by two companies,73 adherence to this black-letter law appeared reasonable. There was no apparent 
inequity in the decision; the court was correct when it observed that Iowa National was being held to no 
more than what it had agreed to do when it accepted premium payments and issued its policy.74 That 
remained true of the subsequent cases applying the Iowa National rule.75 Both St. Paul Schools76 and 
Nordby77  involved auto accidents, and even Jostens78  and Home Insurance Co.79  in which the Court 
reaffirmed Iowa National even as it carved out the loan receipt exception arose from discrete losses (an 
employment dispute in Jostens80 and a patent claim in Home Insurance Co.).81 
                                                          
69 See id. 
70 Iowa Nat’l, 150 N.W.2d at 237 (quoting St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Huitt, 336 F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1964)). 
71 See id. 
72 Id. 
73 See id. 
74 Id. at 238. 
75 See Home Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 522 (Minn. 2003); Jostens, 387 N.W.2d 161(Minn. 1986); Norby, 329 N.W.2d 
820 (Minn. 1983); St. Paul Sch., 321 N.W.2d 41 (Minn. 1982). 
76 321 N.W.2d at 43. 
77 329 N.W.2d at 821. 
78 387 N.W.2d at 167. 
79 658 N.W.2d at 527. 
80 387 N.W.2d at 162. 
81 658 N.W.2d at 524. 
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CARGILL’S LOSS COMPLICATED THE SITUATION 
 
 
Cargill’s case presented a much more complex scenario.82 There was not a discrete occurrence prompting 
the underlying claim.83 There were potentially tens of millions of dollars in losses caused by conduct that 
spanned decades, over the course of which dozens of insurers issued policies that might offer coverage.84 
When Cargill commenced its action against Liberty Mutual and its other insurers, the law in Minnesota was 
that: 
 
absent a loan receipt agreement, an insurer that undertakes the defense of its insured may not seek recovery 
of defense costs from the insured's other insurers who also owed a duty to defend but failed to provide a 
defense.85 
 
Under this rule, Cargill had a good argument. There was no loan receipt agreement, and there could be none 
without Cargill’s consent 86  so any of its insurers that provided a defense would have no right of 
contribution, subrogation or recovery of any kind against any other insurer for defense costs.87 The result 
of strict application of that rule to these facts, however, was obviously unpalatable.  An insurer that provided 
coverage and received premiums for only a few years could end up footing the bill for the defense of claims 
involving decades of alleged misconduct.88 
 
Formally, there was no difference between the circumstances in Iowa National and those in Cargill. In both 
cases, each insurer had an independent duty to defend.89 Neither case involved a contractual relationship 
between the insurers that would give rise to some sort of direct claim for contribution.90 The court itself 
noted this, recognizing that in Iowa National it had “rejected, on every theory possible, the contention that 
an insurer has a right to recovery of defense costs” from another insurer, and concluding that it “is accurate 
to say that under Iowa National, Liberty Mutual does not currently possess a right to have defense costs 
shared among insurers.”91 
 
Pragmatically, however, the difference was significant. The shallow analysis in Iowa National was enabled 
                                                          
82 See Cargill, 784 N.W.2d at 344. 
83 See id.  
84 See id. 
85 Wooddale Builders, Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 722 N.W.2d 283, 302 (Minn. 2006). 
86 See Cargill, 784 N.W.2d at 345. 
87 See Wooddale Builders, Inc., 722 N.W.2d at 302. 
88 See Cargill, 784 N.W.2d at 353-54. 
89 See id. at 358; Iowa Nat’l, 276 N.W.2d at 368. 
90 784 N.W.2d at 353; 276 N.W.2d at 367. 
91 784 N.W.2d at 349. 
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by the discrete nature of the loss. The decision could reasonably be rested, in part, on the idea that the 
paying insurer was doing no more than paying what it had agreed to pay when it issued the auto policy and 
collected its premium.92 But if Iowa National were applied to the Cargill claim, the court observed, “we 
cannot say that any insurer that undertakes to defend Cargill in any of these lawsuits would be ‘answering 
for only his own just and proper share’ of the defense.”93 In its policy, Liberty Mutual had agreed to provide 
Cargill with a defense only where there was an occurrence which resulted “during the policy period, in 
bodily injury or property damage.”94 Confronted with its application to these facts, the Court concluded, 
“[T]he Iowa National rule is contrary to principles of equity.”95 It is interesting that this decision was driven, 
at least in part, by concerns for fairness, not only to the insureds, the usual guiding principle in insurance 
law, but also to the insurers.96 In Jostens, the Court had observed that a determination of which insurance 
company would bear the cost of the insured’s defense “should not depend on the whim or caprice of the 
insured.”97 In Cargill, the Court reasserted its concern “with fairness to the insurers and the insured” in 
seeking “a rule that encouraged insurers to fulfill their respective duties to defend.”98 
 
 




It seems likely that this concern for fairness to insurers was guided by the same interrelated pragmatic 
principles that underlie the decisions of the majority of courts in other jurisdictions that have recognized a 
contribution or subrogation right among insurers. Confronted with the question of why insurers should be 
permitted to recover defense costs from non-participating co-insurers, despite clear rules of contract law to 
the contrary, these courts have landed upon two overlapping answers: a) to promptly afford an insured the 
defense it is entitled to under its policies, and b) to not incentivize insurers to find a reason to deny or delay 
coverage. 
 
In one of the earliest decisions finding that a liability insurer who honors its duty to defend should be able 
to require other insurers “to share in the costs of the insured’s defense,” the California Supreme Court 
                                                          
92 See generally Iowa Nat’l, 276 N.W.2d at 362. 
93 Id. at 351. 
94 Id. (emphasis in decision). 
95 Id. at 352. 
96 Id. at 351. 
97 387 N.W.2d at 167. 
98 784 N.W.2d at 351. In Cargill, application of the newly adopted rule does create some likelihood that the insured 
itself will bear some of the defense costs. Though the Supreme Court did not address this issue directly, it may have 
shared the view of the trial court that “Cargill, a sophisticated business entity, has created this insurance structure, 
and it seems inequitable that they should now be permitted to avoid cooperating with Liberty Mutual (the insurer 
who[m] they have self-chosen to defend their liability claims) because of their concern that the insurance structure 
that they have created may have some adverse consequences to go along with the benefits they have received.” Id. at 
346 (quoting the trial court opinion). 
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acknowledged the competing views on the right of one insurer to seek contribution from another.99 The 
court rejected as practically unrealistic the view that such contribution is impermissible. 100  First, it 
addressed one of the more formalistic reasons given for denying the contribution right – the idea that the 
duty to defend is personal to each insurer.101 Though such a characterization is consistent with the language 
of the policies, the court took the more realistic view “that any services contemplated by the agreement to 
defend are not personal in the sense that the services of any specifically named individual would be 
personal. Rather, such services necessarily contemplate the employment by the company of competent 
licensed attorneys.”102 In other words, the duty to defend is, in a practical sense, no more personal than 
writing a check.103 
 
The California court took a similarly pragmatic approach in analyzing the merits of whether to allow 
contribution among insurers, concluding that permitting contribution would best serve the purposes of 
liability insurance: 
 
Under general principles of equitable subrogation, as well as pursuant to the rule of prime importance – 
that the policy is to be liberally construed to provide coverage to the insured – it is our view that all obligated 
carriers who have refused to defend should be required to share in costs of the insured's defense, whether 
such costs were originally paid by the insured himself or by fewer than all of the carriers. A contrary result 
would simply provide a premium or offer a possible windfall for the insurer who refuses to defend, and 
thus, by leaving the insured to his own resources, enjoys a chance that the costs of defense will be provided 
by some other insurer at no expense to the company which declines to carry out its contractual 
commitments.104 
 
As the court observed, the fact that “each insurer independently owes” its insured a duty to defend 
“constitute[s] no excuse for any insurer’s failure to perform.”105 
 
This concern that insurers not be rewarded for delaying or denying a defense appears in many of the 
decisions granting insurers a right of contribution. The Alaska Supreme Court worried that a rule not 
permitting contribution or subrogation “would make it attractive for insurance companies to disavow 
responsibilities, and to find reasons, in the inevitable ambiguity of the fine print of their policies, to deny 
coverage to the insured,” and reasoned that a “breach of the obligation to defend should not be encouraged 
                                                          
99 Continental Cas. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 366 P.2d 455, 461 (Cal. 1961). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Continental, 366 P.2d at 461. 
103 The Alaska Supreme Court took a similar view of the “personal service” argument.  “We do not think the matter 
should turn upon the fiction that the insurance policy is a contract for the rendition of personal services in the usual 
sense.” Marwell Constr., Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 465 P.2d 298, 313 (Alaska 1970). 
104 Continental, 366 P.2d at 461. 
105 Id. at 461. 
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by a rule under which there is everything to gain and nothing to lose.”106 The Arizona Supreme Court 
expressed the same concern in National Indemnity Co. v. St. Paul Insurance Companies,107 concluding that: 
 
[w]hen an insurer has a duty to defend the insured, there should be no reward to the insurer for breaching 
that duty. A breach of the obligation to defend should not be encouraged, but the rule which allows an 
insurer to avoid the costs of defense tends to encourage an avoidance of the insurer's responsibilities.108 
 
Colorado’s high court likewise held that the effect of a rule denying a participating insurer a right of 
recovery against a non-participating insurer “would be to reward an insurer for refusing to honor its 
contractual obligations by failing to defend a lawsuit brought against the insured that falls within the terms 
of the policy.”109 
 
In Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., the Utah Supreme Court considered a case not dissimilar 
to Cargill. The underlying claim was for environmental damage that spanned multiple coverage periods, 
and the court was concerned about giving insurers a perverse incentive by denying a contribution or 
subrogation right.110 The court noted that “the trend in other jurisdictions has been to allow an insurer, under 
the doctrines of contribution or equitable subrogation, to recover costs of defense from other insurers who 
were equally obligated to defend yet failed to do so.”111 It adopted the same rule, holding that “[w]here it 
can be shown that a co-insurer failed to defend or failed to pay its share of the defense expenses, that insurer 
should not be rewarded and payment excused when another co-insurer has taken upon itself the provision 
of that defense.”112 The court was concerned with how a contrary rule might ultimately affect insureds. 
“Holding otherwise would not only lead to an inequitable result but may also conflict with our stated policy 
of encouraging prompt payments to the insured, leaving disputes concerning coverage to be determined 
later.”113 This concern that allowing insurers who delay or deny a defense to their insureds to avoid any 
liability for that defense could well have the effect of delaying or denying the insured any defense runs 
through most decisions allowing subrogation or contribution among insurers. California was express about 
it, noting that “the rule of prime importance” is that a policy should be “liberally construed to provide 
coverage to the insured.”114 Alaska’s court expressed a similar concern that a rule denying a right of 
contribution among insurers would be “contrary to the important principle that the policy should be 
                                                          
106 Marwell, 465 P.2d 298 at 313. 
107 724 P.2d 544, 545 (Ariz. 1985). 
108 Nat’l Indemnity Co. v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 724 P.2d 544, 545 (Ariz. 1985). 
109 Nat’l Cas. Co. v. Great Sw. Fire Ins. Co., 833 P.2d 741, 748 (Colo. 1992). 
110 931 P.2d 127, 139 (Utah 1997). 
111 Id. at 137. 
112 Id. at 138. 
113 Id. 
114 Continental, 366 P.2d at 461. 
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construed liberally to provide coverage to the insured.”115 
 
The Minnesota Supreme Court had expressed similar concerns even before the Cargill decision.  In Jostens, 
the court was very pragmatic in identifying the issues that needed to be addressed, noting that “any rule we 
fashion should not encourage two insurers with arguable coverage to adopt a 'wait and see' attitude while 
leaving the insured to defend [it]self.”116 This was particularly important because, realistically, not all 
insureds have the ability, as did Cargill and Jostens, to “pay their own way initially.”117 Any rule, therefore, 
should “encourage two insurers, when tendered a defense, to resolve promptly the duty to defend issue 
either by some cooperative arrangement between them, or by a declaratory judgment action, or by some 
other means.”118 The Court did not seem to see the conflict between this sound reasoning and the Iowa 
National rule, which it reaffirmed in Jostens.119 This may have been because the facts of Jostens simply did 
not require it to directly confront the implications of Iowa National. 
 
In Cargill, though, those implications were front and center, and the Court had no difficulty seeing that its 
reasoning in Jostens did not fit with its decision in Iowa National: 
 
The Iowa National rule does little to encourage insurers to “resolve promptly the duty to defend issue.” 
Jostens, 387 N.W.2d at 167; accord Wooddale, 722 N.W.2d at 303. Rather, the Iowa National rule 
encourages any insurer whose policy is arguably triggered to deny its insured a defense and, essentially, 
play the odds that, among all insurers on the risk, it will not be selected by the insured to defend. 
 
We conclude that the Iowa National rule, even as we have modified it over the years, is no longer an 
appropriate result when multiple insurers may be obligated to defend an insured. There is little incentive 
for any single carrier to voluntarily assume the insured's defense. To the contrary, under Iowa National an 
insurer who voluntarily assumes the defense finds itself bearing the entire cost of the insured's defense 
unless the insured enters into a loan receipt agreement. As this case demonstrates, that the insured will enter 
into a loan receipt agreement is by no means assured.120 
 
 
MOST COURTS FOLLOWING THE IOWA NATIONAL APPROACH HAVE GIVEN THE 
PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THE RULE OF LITTLE CONSIDERATION 
 
 
This careful consideration of the practical impact of denying insurers a right of contribution or subrogation 
stands in contrast to the vast majority of the cases that have actually adopted that rule. Most, like Iowa 
National, give little or no consideration to the practicalities of the rule. They rely instead on a formalistic 
                                                          
115 Marwell, 465 P.2d at 313. 
116 Jostens v. Missions Ins. Co., 387 N.W.2d 161, 167 (Minn. 1986). 
117 Id.at 167. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Cargill, Inc., 784 N.W.2d at 352. 
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adherence to principles of contract law. Sloan Construction, Inc. v. Central National Insurance Co. of 
Omaha, for example, was factually similar to Iowa National.121 The underlying case arose out of an auto 
accident, and two insurers had issued policies providing coverage.122 One, Liberty Mutual, provided a 
defense and the other, Central, declined.123 The South Carolina Supreme Court held that because the 
contractual duty to defend is personal to each insurer, and not joint, “the insurer is not entitled to divide the 
duty nor require contribution from another absent a specific contractual right.”124 In language quite similar 
to that in Iowa National, the court reasoned that by providing a defense, Liberty Mutual “was doing no 
more than it was obligated to do under the terms of its contract.” 125 
 
Brayman v. Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co. was another auto accident case.126 The court rejected the 
insurer’s contribution claim on grounds largely indistinguishable from Iowa National. “The duty to defend 
is personal to each insurer. The obligation is several and the carrier is not entitled to divide the duty nor 
require contribution from another absent a specific contractual right.”127 The decision in Transamerica 
Insurance Group v. Empire Mutual Insurance Company was made on essentially the same basis.128 The 
plaintiff insurer had provided a defense to an insured in a suit arising out of a personal injury claim. Another 
insurer declined to provide a defense or to contribute to the defense costs. The court, citing Iowa National, 
held that the paying insurer did not have a right to seek contribution because the two insurers did not have 
a contractual relationship. 129 
 
The same formalistic approach was employed in Barton & Ludwig, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of 
Maryland.130 The underlying suit there arose out of the collapse of a deck. Hartford provided a defense, but 
                                                          
121 236 S.E.2d 818 (S.C. 1977). 
122 Id. at 819. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 820. 
125 Id. The continued vitality of this rule in South Carolina was recognized in Transcontinental Ins. Co. vs. MAJ 
Enterprises, Inc., No. 2:05-2594, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 37928, at *8 (D. S.C. Dec. 19, 2005), in which the court, 
relying upon Sloan, denied an insurer’s demand for contribution from a co-insurer when an insured sued for a 
construction defect. 
126 381 F.Supp. 362 (D. Colo. 1974). 
127 Id. at 363 (quoting U.S. Fid. and Guar. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 285 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1960)). The Colorado 
Supreme Court rejected both Brayman and United States Fidelity in National Casualty Co. v. Great Southwest Fire 
Insurance Co.  833 P.2d 741, 748 (Colo. 1992). 
128 327 A.2d 734 (Ct. Super. 1974). 
129 at 735. The Connecticut Supreme Court revisited this issue in 2003 in Security Insurance Co. of Hartford v. 
Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co– a case that, like Cargill, involved a coverage claim (asbestos in this case) that 
spanned multiple coverage periods. The court noted, with no real discussion, that under Connecticut law equitable 
contribution requires all primary insurers to pay a pro rata share of defense costs. 826 A.2d 107, 123 (Conn. 2003). 
130 570 F.Supp. 1470 (N.D. Ga. 1983). A quarter-century later, the same federal court reversed course and adopted 
the pragmatic analysis employed by a majority of courts. In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Valley Forge 
Insurance Co., “the court finds that the principles of equity that underlie the rule of contribution with respect to the 
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the insured’s other insurers refused one. The court rejected Hartford's demand for contribution or 
subrogation, reasoning, like the courts in Iowa National and Sloan: 
 
When Hartford undertook the defense of Barton & Ludwig in the Jenkins action, it was doing no more than 
it was obligated under the terms of its contract with Barton & Ludwig. The fact that there may have been 
other insurance coverage did not relieve Hartford of its obligation to defend its insured in the tort action. 
131 
 
It also rejected the idea of subrogation because it was Hartford, not the insured, that incurred the defense 
costs. 132 
 
That last piece of reasoning highlights the concerns that prompted the Minnesota Supreme Court to overturn 
Iowa National. Strictly applied, the Georgia court’s reasoning would encourage insurers to wait to pay for 
defense costs until after the insured had incurred them, then indemnify the insured in exchange for a 
subrogation agreement. The insurer might, then, be able to recover a share of those defense costs. For a 
large, well-funded insured, this delayed approach may not pose a significant problem. But, as the Minnesota 
court noted in Jostens and again in Cargill, not all insureds have the wherewithal “to pay their own way 
initially.”133 Insurers are thus left with trepidation about providing any defense for fear of bearing more 
than their fair share of its cost, and insureds find themselves trying to maintain a defense without the 
insurance coverage they purchased. From this reality, the pragmatic basis for the Cargill decision is distilled 
into a distinctly practical observation: “If Liberty Mutual (or the other insurers) knew that Minnesota 
recognized an equitable right of contribution, and absent the Iowa National rule, we would likely not have 
this present case before us.”134  
 
 
A CONTRARY VIEW: PRAGMATIC REASONS TO REJECT CARGILL? 
 
 
Though the accuracy of this observation seems largely indisputable, the pragmatism underlying the Cargill 
decision is not universally accepted. As discussed above, the vast majority of the courts that have denied a 
contribution right among insurers have done so on formalistic contractual grounds, with little or no 
discussion of why the outcome is now or ever was appropriate. In Florida, however, courts have addressed 
the issue a number of times, and over the years have developed their own jurisprudence rejecting 
contribution for what they may describe as their own pragmatic reasons. 
                                                          
ultimate loss apply equally to the costs to defend. Absent a right to contribution, an insurer has no incentive to 
perform its duty to defend when it knows that the insured has another primary insurer. The non-performing insurer 
may simply wait out an insured without suffering any consequences, as the insured is unlikely to face a breach of 
contract suit from an insured whose needs are ultimately met by another party.” No. 1:06-CV-2074-JOF, 2009 US 
Dist. LEXIS 23663, *29 (N.D. Ga. March 23, 2009). 
131 Id. at 1472. 
132 Id. at 1473. 
133 784 N.W.2d at 350 (quoting Jostens). 
134 See id. at 352. 
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The Third District Court of Appeals decision in Argonaut Insurance Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.,135 gives 
the same formalistic reason for rejecting an insurer’s contribution claim that has been cited in other 
jurisdictions. Noting that there “is no contractual relationship between” the insurers, the court held that the 
“duty of each insurer to defend its insured is personal and cannot inure to the benefit of another insurer. 
Contribution is not allowed between insurers for expenses incurred in defense of a mutual insured.”136 The 
decision is rooted in the formalistic rule that “[a]n insurer's obligation to defend its insured is contractual 
and does not arise from common law.” 137 
 
In Argonaut, however, the court went on to give some consideration to the pragmatic concerns that were 
ultimately relied upon in Cargill. It rejected the idea that its formal, contract-based rule might encourage 
“defaults on contractual agreements to defend” because there are other disincentives in the law to 
discourage such conduct.138  
 
If an insurance company refuses to defend or provide contractual coverage to its insured, then it may expose 
its policy limits to a third party and faces a breach of contract suit with other statutory remedies (e.g., 
Section 627.421(1), Florida Statutes) By [sic] the insured. . . . All necessary remedies and protection to the 
proper parties are available to enforce all necessary rights. 139 
 
This reasoning appears crafted more to justify adherence to the formalistic rule than to realistically address 
the pragmatic concerns. While it is true that most jurisdictions provide a remedy for insureds who are denied 
a defense by their liability insurers, the Argonaut decision fails to recognize that under its rule: a) once an 
insured gets a defense from one insurer, it is unlikely to pursue claims against any other insurer; b) the 
insurer that provides the defense (either voluntarily or under court order) is denied the ability pursue those 
other insurers; and so, c) all of the insurers have an incentive to play a litigious game of chicken, delaying 
any coverage in the hope that one of their compatriots will end up footing the entire bill. 
 
Argonaut did not address this issue directly, but Florida’s Fifth District did in Continental Casualty Co. v. 
United Pacific Insurance Co.140  Continental Casualty argued that the Argonaut rule should be rejected on 
public policy grounds to prevent insurers from “shirking” or “lagging behind” in the hope that some other 
insurer would pick up the defense obligation.141 The appellate court was unimpressed: 
 
We begin by refusing simply to assume the premise on which the public policy rationale for creating a right 
of contribution has been based. Continental contends broadly that, without the creation of this rule [the right 
                                                          
135 See 372 So. 2d at 963 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). 
136 See id. at 963 (citations omitted). 
137 See id. at 963–64. 
138 See id. at 964. 
139 See id. 
140 See 637 So. 2d 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
141 See id. at 273. 
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to contribution among insurers], insurers will seek with impunity to evade their responsibilities to defend 
their Florida insureds. No evidence was offered below, however, that Florida's current rule disallowing 
contribution has led to "shirking," "lagging behind" or "bad faith" on the part of insurers. Presumably, 
Continental, one of the most prominent liability insurers in Florida, would deny it has ever been induced to 
act in such a manner. Several factors discourage such misconduct, including exposure to greater loss if the 
other insurer is ineffective in its defense, and the risk of suits by its own insured on theories of breach of 
contract and statutory and common law "bad faith." It is important to keep in mind that insurers have not 
only the duty to defend but often contractually reserve the right to defend. Insurers know the ability to 
control the defense of a liability case is the most effective way to limit their loss and protect themselves 
from extra-contractual claims. 142 
 
The court reasoned that there were adequate measures in place to prevent insurers from acting in bad faith, 
and supported that conclusion with the absence of evidence that insurers had been abusing the existing rule 
disallowing contribution.143 A dissent was less convinced, worrying that “[u]nder Argonaut, insurers play 
the game of ‘chicken,’ forcing the other equally obligated insurer to undertake the defense first, while 
flirting around the edges of bad faith breach of their duty to defend.”144 The responsible insurer is thus 
“penalized” while “the unresponsive insurer is saved from any bad faith suit by its insured, or any other 
third party, by the diligence and effort of the other insurer.”145  
 
The dissent’s concerns have not altered the law in Florida. In 2009, a federal court applied the 
Argonaut/Continental rule to a dispute between two companies that each insured a health care professional 
who was sued for wrongful death in American Casualty Company of Reading Pennsylvania v. Health Care 
Indemnity, Inc.146 American Casualty had provided defense and indemnity to the insured, and the court 
acknowledged that HCI also had duty to defend. Nevertheless, relying on Argonaut the court held that 
American Casualty did not have a right to pursue contribution.147 The court did acknowledge that the ruling 
“may appear to reward HCI's behavior of ignoring its insured's requests for coverage.”148  However, the 
federal court found persuasive Continental’s conclusion that the Argonaut rule does not act as an incentive 
for insurers to delay or deny coverage – though it did not deny that HCI had, in fact, benefited from its 
recalcitrance.149  
 
While their persuasiveness may be questionable, these decisions do highlight a couple of issues relevant to 
                                                          
142 See id. 
143 See id. at 273. 
144 See id. at 276. 
145 See id. at 276–77. 
146 613 Fla. Supp.2d 1310 (M.D. Fla. 2009). 
147 Id. at 1322. 
148 Id. at 1323. 
149 Id.  See also Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 43 So. 3d 182 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (denying insurer’s right to obtain indemnity for defense costs, citing Argonaut  and 
Continental). 
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this article. First, having an answer to the “why” question, even a good answer, does not guarantee victory. 
And second, the reason you lose may be that your answer prompts more questions than you are prepared to 
answer. 
 
The court in Continental did not merely reject the public policy grounds that had been advanced by 
Continental. It went on to question the pragmatic value of a rule permitting contribution among insurers. 
The adoption of such a rule, the court worried, would simply spawn more litigation over the scope of the 
rule.150  As an example, the court cited the Idaho case of Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Mutual of 
Enumclaw Insurance Co.,151 in which each insurer paid defense costs, but one paid less than the other. The 
Idaho court held that because the defendant insurer had provided a defense, no contribution right arose. The 
Florida court opined that all the creation of a right of contribution had accomplished was to encourage 
“insurers in multiple coverage cases to defend, but permitting them to defend as little as possible in hopes 
another carrier will pick up the slack.” 152 
 
 




The Minnesota Supreme Court preempted this particular dispute with its Cargill decision by ruling that 
defense costs are to be shared equally by all insurers with a defense obligation.153  While the ultimate 
fairness of this rule could be questioned – it leaves an insurer that covered the insured for only a single year 
paying as much as one that was on the loss for a decade – that concern may be outweighed by the value of 
a clear rule.  Regardless of how you come down on that particular question, for purposes of this article it is 
worth noting that the question exists, and it isn’t the only one. By crafting a new rule governing the sharing 
of defense costs among liability insurers, the Court leaves unanswered (or only partially answered) a 
number of issues that may need to be addressed in future cases.  These include: 
 
- Is the right created by Cargill truly a right of contribution—as the Court seems to say in the final page of 
the opinion—or is it in the nature of subrogation? Does it matter? Many courts have used the terms almost 
interchangeably in discussing the general issue of whether an insurer can recover a share of defense costs. 
However, in Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co. v. USF Insurance Co.,154 the court rejected an insurer’s 
contribution claim against co-insurers to whom the insured had not tendered the defense, but left open the 
possibility that it might recover against those same insurers in subrogation. 
 
- Who decides which insurers are liable for defense costs? In a footnote, the Cargill decision maintains the 
                                                          
150 One pragmatic value of the no-contribution rule is its clarity. There may be legitimate questions about its fairness 
or even its efficacy, but it does have the benefit of allowing everyone to know what to expect, and dissuading 
litigation like the Cargill case. 
151 See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 1315 (Idaho 1992). 
152 Continental, 637 So. 2d at 274. 
153 See 784 N.W.2d at 354. 
154 See Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. USF Ins. Co., 191 P.3d 866 (Wash. 2008). 
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rule “that an insurer's duty to defend is not triggered until the insured has provided the insurer ‘with notice 
of a suit and opportunity to defend.’”155  If an insured fails to provide that notice, does an insurer that accepts 
its defense have the right to notify the other insurers? Could an insured like Cargill limit its own liability 
under fronted policies by being deliberately selective about which insurers it notifies?156 Or would doing 
so be a breach of the insured’s duty to cooperate or of good faith? Does an insured have a duty, when it 
submits the defense to one of its insurers, to notify that insurer of the other insurance companies that may 
have a defense obligation? 
 
- What is the interplay between the contribution right and the Court’s instruction that “breach of a duty to 
defend precludes application” of that right? While this rule seems necessary to satisfy the public policy 
purposes underlying the Cargill decision, its precise application remains in question.157 If an insured seeks 
defense coverage from one of its insurers, is it a breach of the duty to defend if that insurer pays its share 
of those costs promptly, but waits to pay the balance until the co-insurers contribute their share? It seems 
that it probably should be if the goal is to be sure the insured’s defense is not delayed; but this also may 
shift to the insurer the potential expense of litigating the coverage disputes with the other insurers. Indeed, 
in Cargill, because of the structure of Cargill’s insurance program, it may lead to the unusual situation in 
which Cargill, the insured, is arguing that some number of its fronting insurers do not have a duty to defend 
and so do not have to contribute to defense costs. 
 
- The purpose of this article is not to answer these, or any questions of substantive law. The purpose is to 
point out that in every case, the “why” questions should be asked. Winning may depend on your ability to 
give the court not just a rule that favors your client, but a good reason to apply that rule. Judges want to 
follow the law, but they also want to be just. As Bryan Garner and Justice Scalia point out in their excellent 
book on legal argument, “[i]t is therefore important to your case to demonstrate, if possible, not only that 
your client does prevail under applicable law but also that this result is reasonable.”158 It is even more 
important if your client does not “prevail under applicable law” to be ready to explain why that applicable 
law needs to change. 
 
One of the common law’s oldest maxims is that “where the reason for a rule ceases the rule should also 
                                                          
155 784 N.W.2d at 354 n.14 (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Nat. Fire Ins. of Pittsburgh, 658 N.W.2d 522, 534 (Minn. 
2003)).  See also Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724, 739 (Minn. 1997) (reiterating “the general 
rule that an insured does not invoke its insurer’s duty to defend until it properly tenders a defense request”). 
156 See Inst. of London Underwriters v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 234 Ill. App. 3d 70, 599 N.E.2d 1311, 175 Ill. Dec. 
297 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (denying contribution right against co-insurer from whom the insured chose not to seek 
coverage). 
157 Some light may yet be shone on this particular issue in the Cargill litigation. On remand, Cargill seized upon this 
portion of the Supreme Court’s decision and filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Liberty Mutual is 
barred from seeking contribution, even under Cargill, because it breached its duty to defend when it declined to pay 
all of Cargill’s defense costs in 2005.  As of this writing, the trial court has not made a decision on that motion; 
regardless of the trial court’s decision, given the stakes it seems reasonable to expect the question to find its way to 
the state’s appellate courts. 
158 Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges 27 (2008). 
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cease.”159 A natural corollary to that maxim is that “when it occurred to the courts that a particular rule had 
never been founded upon reason, and that no reason existed in support thereof, that rule likewise ceased, 
and perhaps another sprang up in its place which was based upon reason and justice as then conceived.”160 
Before that new and (hopefully) better rule can spring up, somebody has to ask – and be ready to answer – 







                                                          
159 The Supreme Court collected a number of decisions extolling this maxim in Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 
384 (1933). 
160 Ketelsen v. Stilz, 184 Ind. 702, 708, 111 N.E. 423, 425 (1916). 
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